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TURNING TO ANIMALS BETWEEN LOVE AND LAW
Anat Pick
Abstract As an alternative to Utilitarianism, animal ethics turned to the Continental 
philosophies of Levinas and Derrida that welcome and revere Otherness. While 
Utilitarianism relies on a ‘closed’ system of ethical calculations, the Levinasian 
model remains open-ended. This essay argues for a revised approach to animal ethics 
that combines Levinasian immeasurability, what Matthew Calarco called ‘ethical 
agnosticism’, with a closed approach that sees ethics as issuing from particular modes 
of practice. Highlighting some of the problems inherent in the Levinasian ethics of 
love as well as Agamben’s biopolitical critique of law, I propose a corrective, ‘between 
love and law’, that avoids predetermining the limits of moral consideration yet insists 
on the social and normative dimensions of ethical responsiveness. I take the practice 
of veganism - broadly conceived beyond the strictly dietary - as the heart of animal 
ethics and consider some of the philosophical and theological dimensions of veganism 
as neither naïve nor as utopian but on the contrary, as a worldly mode of engagement 
that acknowledges the realities of violence. 
Keywords transcendence and immanence, animal ethics, the problem of 
violence, veganism, Simone Weil, Gillian Rose, Donna Haraway
Grace is the law of the descending movement. To lower oneself is to rise 
in the domain of moral gravity. Moral gravity makes us fall towards the 
heights. 
       Simone Weil1
Animal ethics is perhaps the clearest example of the demands of justice as the 
falling towards the heights. To consider animals we have to stop, and stoop, 
required to withhold most if not all of the descriptive and normative claims 
that furnish and shape our everyday. In recent developments, as an alternative 
to the dominant utilitarian and rights-based models, animal ethics turned 
to the Continental philosophies of Levinas and Derrida that welcome and 
revere Otherness. Whereas utilitarianism relies on a ‘closed’ system of ethical 
calculations, the Levinasian model remains open-ended. This essay argues for 
a revised approach to animal ethics that combines Levinasian immeasurability, 
the disposition Matthew Calarco describes as ‘ethical agnosticism’, with a 
closed approach that sees ethics as embodied in particular modes of practice. 
By highlighting some of the problems inherent in the Levinasian model of 
an ethics of love, I propose a corrective that avoids predetermining the limits 
of moral consideration yet insists on the social and normative dimensions of 
ethical responsiveness. I take the practice of veganism - broadly conceived 
1. Simone Weil, 
Gravity and Grace 
(1947), Emma 
Crawford and 
Mario von der Ruhr 
(trans), London, 
Routledge, 2004, p4. 
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beyond the strictly dietary - as the heart of animal ethics and consider some 
of the philosophical and theological dimensions of veganism as neither naïve 
nor as utopian but, on the contrary, as a worldly mode of engagement that 
acknowledges the realities of violence. Veganism’s worldliness is an example 
of ‘descending upwards’ that gives shape to animal ethics, conjoining the 
openness of love with the delimited and bound system of law. 
 Preceding my discussion of veganism are a few reflections on contemporary 
Continental thought that has transformed animal ethics; the first two sections 
examine the dual theoretical track of transcendence and immanence that 
has been so important for developments in critical theory and posthumanist 
ethics. My critique of these two undercurrents informs the latter parts of the 
essay where I tackle the issue of animal ethics directly. My conclusion links 
veganism to abolitionist animal rights theory, which is rarely if ever considered 
from the perspective of Continental philosophy. If the route to the question 
of animal ethics seems tortuous, this is because my aim in this piece is to 
call attention to the theoretical temperament that underlies our thinking in 
the field. In other words, I am trying to connect ideas with the ‘moods’ that 
engender them, to better understand where and to what practical ends they 
might lead.  
I  ANIMALS AND THE SACRAL REALM OF EXCEPTION
The work of ethics and of justice for Simone Weil is paradigmatically the 
movement of descending upwards- not figuratively but literally - and animals, 
routinely excluded from view and from the moral community, are a case in 
point. Animals’ exclusion initially appears almost too self-evident to warrant 
comment, too visible to really appear. At all levels of life animals are subject 
to a catalogue of relentless bracketing. Morally, legally, politically, culturally, 
and religiously, animals are exemplars of exclusion, not merely symbolically, 
remaining outside or at the threshold of these various categories, but 
empirically: they embody a particular, and we might say an exclusive, case 
of exclusion. Despite what we know about the ‘continuities of oppression’ 
across species lines, nonhuman animals occupy an exceptional space, and 
the space of exception. 
 Yet as recent theorizing on animals and animality has shown, animals’ very 
exceptionality endows them with a strange kind of agency which Matthew 
Calarco, following Derrida’s ‘The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to 
Follow)’, describes as ‘the disruptive force in animal suffering’.2 In their 
very exclusion, then, animals assert their proximity to and elicit a range of 
responses from us, from repression to violent retaliation to the recognition of 
animals’ personhood. Eating animals, the most ubiquitous form of exclusion 
from the moral community, itself suggests the simultaneity of intimacy and 
distance since the practices of killing and ingesting, however mechanized 
and rationalized, may be said to bear the traces of the sacrificial economy 
2. Matthew Calarco, 
Zoographies: The 
Question of the Animal 
from Heidegger 
to Derrida, New 
York,  Columbia 
University Press, 
2008, p120. See also 
Jacques Derrida, 
‘The Animal That 
Therefore I Am 
(More to Follow)’, 
Critical Inquiry 28, 
no. 2 (Winter 2002): 
369-418. 
70     NEW FORMATIONS
of communion. Indeed in most world religions, meat consumption remains 
subject to regulation and prohibition.3
 Two seemingly opposing theories, whose central figure is the excluded, 
have informed recent formulations of animals’ predicament: the first is the 
ethics of Emmanuel Levinas, the second the biopolitics of Giorgio Agamben. 
Levinas and Agamben have been at the heart of recent debates on ethics and 
politics but they have had an equally decisive impact on the way we conceive 
human-animal relations and the field of animal ethics. While Agamben and 
Levinas both touch on the question of animals, they do so reluctantly: in 
their accounts animality, not animals, is mobilized conceptually rather than 
concretely to explore the structure and function of otherness and othering 
in the configurations of subjectivity and politics.4 
 In what follows, I reflect on some of the ways in which the seemingly polar 
approaches of Levinas and Agamben have enlivened debates in animal ethics 
and yet also constrained our readiness to address the everyday consequences of 
animals’ moral standing. I offer a brief description, or diagnosis, of the current 
tendency for a radicalized, or what I think of as the bipolar, theorization of 
exception in the context of moral attitudes towards animals. I then propose a 
mediating remedy to these tendencies, a remedy I name the ‘creaturely’. This 
corrective is best understood in light of the recent emergence of post-secular 
theory that aims at a rapprochement between religion and the discourses 
of philosophy and politics. My aim is to show how theology comes to bear 
upon the ‘question of the animal’ and brings to light some of the difficulties 
inherent in the secular discourse that dominates animal ethics and separates 
divine from intellectual governance, and the bipolarity that pushes ethics 
towards the sacral exclusory realms of ethical or biopolitical messianism. 
II  THE BIPOLAR TURN: TRANSCENDENCE, IMMANENCE, AND THE 
PROBLEM OF VIOLENCE
Discussing Leo Strauss’ comments on Spinoza’s excommunication, William 
E. Connolly argues that the ‘persisting conflict’ in the history of ideas ‘is 
not exactly between “belief and unbelief ”’, faith and reason, but, as it were, 
between different species of faith. Connolly describes this as ‘the difference 
between a positive belief in transcendence over the world and a positive belief 
in the immanence of the world’.5 Not only have these orientations, towards 
transcendence and towards immanence, been crucial in shaping developments 
in critical theory, both have contributed a great deal to debates around the 
question of the animal and animal ethics.
 The critical terrain between Levinas and Agamben has proved fertile in 
responding to dominant modes within the two, hardly mutually conversant, 
fields of political theory and animal studies.6 There is little doubt that 
biopolitics and poststructuralist ethics have disrupted our anthropocentric 
view of human and nonhuman life through their rigorous critiques of 
3. On meat eating 
and communion 
see my critique of 
Temple Grandin 
in Creaturely 
Poetics: Animality 
and Vulnerability in 
Literature and Film, 
New York, Columbia 
University Press, 
2011, pp68-69.  
4. See Agamben’s 
The Open: Man and 
Animal, Kevin Attell 
(trans), Stanford, 
Stanford University 
Press, 2002, and 
Levinas’ ‘The Name 
of a Dog, or Natural 
Rights’, in Difficult 
Freedom: Essays on 
Judaism, Seán Hand 
(trans), London, 
Athlone Press, 
1990, pp151-3. See 
also ‘The Paradox 
of Morality: an 
Interview with 
Emmanuel Levinas’, 
in The Provocation of 
Levinas: Rethinking 
the Other, London, 
Routledge, 1988, 
Robert Bernasconi 
and David Wood 
(eds), pp168–80; 
and Calarco’s ‘Facing 
the Other Animal’, 
in Zoographies, op. 
cit., pp55-77. 
5. William E. 
Connolly, ‘Pluralism 
and Faith,’ in 
Political Theologies: 
Public Religions in a 
Post-Secular World, 
New York, Fordham 
University Press, 
2006, Hent de Vries 
and Lawrence E. 
Sullivan, (eds), p284. 
See also Eugene 
Thacker, After Life, 
Chicago, University 
of Chicago Press, 
2010, which ‘isolates 
two traditions that 
address the ontology 
of life: the first is 
the dominant thread 
… which constructs 
an ontology of 
life … governed 
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subjectivity. For Matthew Calarco, this critique is crucial to the development 
of a properly egalitarian ‘universal moral consideration’ that is ‘fundamentally 
opposed to any and all perfectionism and…does not imply that certain beings 
should have lesser or inferior rights to those of human beings’.7 As Calarco 
explains: 
The central issue concerning the critique of the metaphysics of subjectivity 
concerns more than the consequences of a certain legacy of Cartesian 
subjectivity in modernity and postmodernity; if this critique is understood 
in a rigorous manner, it leads us to see more fully the inner connection 
between metaphysical humanism and metaphysical anthropocentrism.8
In the name of a genuinely radical politics, neither humanistic nor 
anthropocentric, Calarco pursues the varieties of Continental postmetaphysical 
thought to their (logical) end, at which point they (logically) yield a 
postmetaphysical politics freed from the centripetal pull of humanism and 
anthropocentrism. I share Calarco’s call for an ethics and politics whose 
ideas and objectives are not strictly human or anthropocentric as the only 
conceivable framework for opening to and accounting for the realities of 
all - human and other - lives. And yet the rapid rise of immanent biopolitics 
and transcendental ethics, both of which fall under the broad rubric of 
posthumanism, also reveals some interesting cultural impulses that I believe 
need to be identified and critiqued. 
 In his book The Problem With Grace, Vincent Lloyd examines the significance 
of the division between immanence and transcendence within the field of 
political theology (among those working within this field we can arguably 
count Agamben and Levinas, as well as theorists whose thought ranges across 
biopolitics and ethics, such as Judith Butler). Lloyd sees political theology 
as governed by a logic of worldly fallenness that seeks redemption in either 
immanent or in transcendent forms: 
Political theology, as well as adjunct discourses such as theories 
of secularization, has focused on shifts between ‘immanent’ and 
‘transcendent’ conceptions of God, noting how these correlate with 
different political structures. The requisite fix to the fallen world comes 
either from outside (in sovereign God or sovereign king) or from within. 
Such political theology reduced theology to the practice of pointing 
outside or pointing inside. Reducing the richness of theological tradition 
to two vague gestures leads directly into the trap of discarding Law in 
favor of Grace, for it focuses on modes of redemption rather than modes 
of living and acting, religiously or politically.9
Lloyd wants to move away from the either-or (inside-outside) approach, 
which reflects what he calls a ‘supersessionist logic,’ towards a ‘middle path’.10 
by transcendent 
emanation. The 
second tradition 
is a more radical, 
“heretical” 
orientation in 
which life is defined 
by negation, 
univocity-equivocity, 
and the concept 
of pantheistic 
immanence’ (xii). 
6. See Cary 
Wolfe’s Before the 
Law: Humans and 
Other Animals in a 
Biopolitical Frame, 
Chicago, University 
of Chicago Press, 
forthcoming 2012.    
7. Matthew Calarco, 
‘Between Life and 
Rights,’ The Death 
of the Animal: A 
Dialogue, New York, 
Columbia University 
Press, 2009, pp135-
138, p138. 
8. Calarco, 
Zoographies, op. cit., 
p13. 
9. Vincent W. Lloyd, 
The Problem with 
Grace: Reconfiguring 
Political Theology, 
Stanford, Stanford 
University Press, 
2011, p2. 
10. Ibid., p2.
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Indeed, The Problem With Grace draws explicitly on the work of the philosopher/
sociologist/theologian Gillian Rose and her concept of the ‘broken middle’, 
to which I too will shortly refer. In light of Agamben and Levinas’ respective 
legacies, I want to question the emphasis placed on the figures of exclusion 
and exception as symptomatic of supersessionist thinking. In Agamben, they 
appear in the figure of homo sacer (as well as the Muselmann) in his state of 
‘bare life,’ while in Levinas it is the unseated self, dissolved in the scorching 
glory of the Other. 
 Levinas’ exceptional gesture is revealed in the undoing of the self ’s 
intentionality and self-presence, the self ‘held hostage’ by radical alterity. 
Exclusion in Levinas is not, therefore, only exclusion pertaining to the Other, 
as we might initially intuit, but the exclusion of the self as wilful subject and 
sovereign. Levinasian exclusion is carried forth by the sweeping formlessness, 
indeed lawlessness, of the other person who is always already before or beyond 
me and whose transcendence infinitely exceeds totalization. The ethical 
encounter according to Levinas is precisely this traumatizing and disrupting 
of the imperial self by the Other’s boundless destitution. Seen positively, in 
Calarco’s succinct formulation, Levinasian ethics is ‘an interruption of my 
egoism coming from the face of an Other that transforms my being in the 
direction of generosity’.11 Rose reads this transformation negatively as an 
expression of nihilism and a rejection of reason: ‘to become ethical, this self is 
to be devastated, traumatised, unthroned, by the commandment to substitute 
the other for itself ’.12 Agamben’s exclusory gesture, in the form of the ‘state of 
exception’ and bare life explored in the series of homo sacer books, signals the 
biopolitical focus on bodily exposure - the body’s devastation that cements 
sovereign power.13 
 In a sense, then, ethics and biopolitics represent opposite discourses: the 
former emphasizes the absolute exteriority of the Other who is otherwise than 
being or beyond essence, while the latter signals a return to embodiment 
as the bedrock of sovereign life. Yet from the point of view of the idiom of 
exclusion, we can recognize in the swings between ethics and biopolitics a 
kind of impatience with what Rose called ‘the broken middle’, an impatience 
tantamount to a purism and Puritanism which for Rose border on the 
nihilistic.14 
 An unqualified fascination with versions of extreme exclusion constitutes 
the bipolar turn in critical theory. The salvific urge underlying such 
radicalizations seems to me potentially to limit the ways we feel capable of 
speaking about the pressing issue Cora Diamond labelled plainly as ‘injustice 
and animals’,15 ways that are not reducible to the forsaken dispensable body 
or the Other’s overwhelming vulnerability - ‘overwhelming’ in the double 
sense of verb (the Other’s ‘hyper-active’ battering of the self) and adjective 
(the Other’s ‘hyper-passive’ weakness that disarms the self).16 We would do 
better, I think, to return, compelled by the insights provided by Agamben 
and Levinas, to a ‘civilized’ discussion not only of exclusion and exception as 
11. Calarco, ‘Toward 
an Agnostic Animal 
Ethics,’ in Death of 
the Animal, op. cit., 
p78.
12. Gillian Rose, 
Mourning Becomes 
the Law: Philosophy 
and Representation, 
Cambridge, 
Cambridge 
University Press, 
1996, p37.
13. Giorgio 
Agamben’s Homo 
Sacer: Sovereign 
Power and Bare Life, 
Daniel Heller-
Roazen (trans), 
Stanford, Stanford 
University Press, 
1998; Remnants of 
Auschwitz: The Witness 
and the Archive, 
Daniel Heller-
Roazen (trans), 
New York, Zone 
Books, 1999; and 
State of Exception, 
Kevin Attell (trans), 
Chicago, University 
of Chicago Press, 
2005. 
14. The ‘broken 
middle’ is explored 
throughout Rose’s 
work. See Hegel 
Contra Sociology, 
London, Verso, 
2009; Dialectic of 
Nihilism: Post-
Structuralism and 
Law, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1984; The 
Broken Middle: Out 
of Our Ancient Society 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 
1992). For Rose’s 
critique of Levinas 
and Weil, see ‘Angry 
Angels: Simone 
Weil and Emmanuel 
Levinas,’ in Judaism 
and Modernity: 
Philosophical 
Essays, Cambridge, 
Blackwell, 1993.  
15. Cora Diamond, 
‘Injustice and 
Animals’, in Slow 
Cures and Bad 
Philosophies: Essays 
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the sole loci of oppression, but of exploitation and justice: a return, that is, 
to the elaborate, mundane realities and structures of power, oppression, and 
exploitation (of humans and other animals) and the agendas for combating 
them. Put differently, a preoccupation with radical Otherness threatens to 
lock us into a hypnotic vacillation between the two polar positions alluded to 
by Connolly: between the position of radical transcendence (ethics) and radical 
immanence (biopolitics). We may seek relief from violence in what Judith 
Butler calls ‘a new bodily ontology’ or else in a flight from subjectivity via the 
magnetism of the Other.17 That the opposition between radical transcendence 
and radical immanence is finally cosmetic is apparent from their common 
dependence on states of exception and the uncanny resemblance between 
the unknowable, well-nigh material opacity of the Levinasian Other and the 
bare, well-nigh abstract translucence of homo sacer. 
 The problem of violence, at the root of Levinas and Agamben’s reflections 
on subjectivity, sociality, and the political, and at the centre, too, of animal 
ethics, cannot be fully addressed in reference to the two states of exception. 
For the issue of violence to come fully into view, one needs to acknowledge the 
potential of violence beyond all mechanisms of exclusion. That way lies a truly 
troubling proposition: that violence does not solely depend on mechanisms 
that distance and estrange, that frame lives in such a way as to render them 
ungrievable, but also and simultaneously on mechanisms that presuppose 
kinship and precariousness: violence is always also domestic violence. It is in this 
light that the potential for violence - and its alleviation - materializes most 
consequentially. In violence, processes of othering fluctuate, interchange, and 
intermingle with the recognition of precariousness and kinship, rethought as 
a complex and belligerent zone. For without the recognition of the Other’s 
suffering and injurability, violence has neither meaning nor function and 
loses its somber, titillating drive. 
 To situate the problem of violence strictly in mechanisms of exclusion 
is to seek release from violence in the gestures of indefinite hospitality 
and welcome. For Rose, violence, for example the violence of Auschwitz, is 
thought through and countered in the persistence of both subjectivity and 
the municipality, not in the desire for their ultimate surpassing. To think 
municipally of Auschwitz means refusing to understand it as the demonic 
inversion of the ‘first city’ of Reason (Athens), as ‘the end-product and telos of 
modern rationality’.18 The condemnation of reason as inherently murderous 
culminates in the fantasy of a ‘second city’ (New Jerusalem) with its promise 
of a ‘new ethics of the unbounded community’.19 In this constellation of cities, 
Auschwitz becomes the ‘fourth city,’ after Athens and Jerusalem, disclosing 
a mediating third: Auschwitz ‘arising out of, and as falling back into, the 
ambitions and the tensions, the utopianism and the violence, the reason and 
the muddle, which is the outcome of the struggle between the politics and 
the anti-politics of the city. This is the third city - the city in which we all live 
and with which we are too familiar’.20 The ‘third city’ - neither Athens nor a 
on Wittgenstein, 
Medicine, and 
Bioethics, Durham, 
Duke University 
Press, 2001, Carl 
Elliott (ed), pp118-
148.
 
16. In a third sense, 
‘overwhelming,’ 
thought as a noun-
which-is-yet-not-a-
noun - that is as a 
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insight into the 
status of the 
Levinasian Other: 
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nor an adjective 
(‘overwhelming’ as 
present participle) 
yet not quite a noun, 
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beyond being. I 
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17. Judith Butler, 
Frames of War: When 
is Life Grievable?, 
London, Verso, 
2009, p2.
18. Rose, ‘Athens 
and Jerusalem: A 
Tale of Three Cities’, 
in Mourning Becomes 
the Law, op. cit., p34. 
19. Ibid., p25.
20. Ibid., p34. 
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New Jerusalem - is where the difficult work of justice, ethics, and politics is 
undertaken. 
 There is, moreover, something faulty in the idea that now - in the aftermath 
we call modernity and postmodernity - the ‘old’ ontologies are defunct and we 
no longer know what it means, in Butler’s words, ‘to apprehend a life’. Here, 
the reflections of two reactionaries may offer some assistance. The eponymous 
Artur Sammler, in Saul Bellow’s 1970 novel Mr. Sammler’s Planet, provides a 
disgruntled rebuke of Hannah Arendt’s idea of the ‘banality of evil’: 
The idea of making the century’s great crime look dull is not banal. 
Politically, psychologically, the Germans had an idea of genius. The 
banality was only camouflage. What better way to get the curse out of 
murder than to make it look ordinary, boring, or trite? …. But do you 
think the Nazis didn’t know what murder was? Everybody (expect certain 
blue-stockings) knows what murder is. That is very old human knowledge. 
The best and purest human beings, from the beginnings of time, have 
understood that life is sacred. To defy that old understanding is not 
banality. There was a conspiracy against the sacredness of life. Banality is 
adopted disguise of a very powerful will to abolish conscience. Is such a 
project trivial? Only if human life is trivial. The woman professor’s enemy 
is modern civilization itself. She is only using the Germans to attack the 
twentieth-century - to denounce it in terms invented by Germans. Making 
use of tragic history to promote foolish ideas of Weimar intellectuals.21
Bellow’s borderline misanthropy and misogyny aside (Arendt is no ‘blue-
stocking’), the insistence on the ‘old human knowledge’ of life’s sacredness, 
what in a secular register is called ‘precariousness’, precisely asserts an ‘old 
bodily ontology’, which the crisis of European modernity, whose apotheosis 
is the Holocaust, allegedly threw into radical doubt. Bellow’s character calls 
for the restoration of the one and only bodily ontology, which we must insist 
upon in the face of Auschwitz. 
 Similarly, G.K. Chesterton decries the repression of the ‘fact of sin’22 in 
an example that returns us to the matter of animals: 
If it be true (as it certainly is) that a man can feel exquisite happiness in 
skinning a cat, then the religious philosopher can only draw one of two 
deductions. He must either deny the existence of God, as all atheists do; 
or he must deny the present union between God and man, as all Christians 
do. The new theologians seem to think it a highly rationalistic solution 
to deny the cat.23
To ‘deny the cat’, to misapprehend its life, is for Chesterton objectionable from 
both the point of view of the thoroughly ‘modern’ atheist and the ‘pre-modern’ 
believer. In these accounts, the ‘loss’ of the cat - the loss of what Butler calls 
21. Saul Bellow, Mr. 
Sammler’s Planet, 
London, Penguin, 
1995 [1970], pp13-
14. 
22. G.K. Chesterton, 
Orthodoxy, 
Massachusetts, 
Hendrickson 
Publishers, 2006 
[1908], p11.
23. Ibid., pp10-11.
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the intelligibility of life as a life - is akin to what Cary Wolfe, in his discussion 
of Stanley Cavell, describes as the post-Kantian ‘loss of the world’ and Rose, 
in Hegel Contra Sociology, analyzes under the ‘neo-Kantian paradigm’.24 There 
is no cat, and therefore no crime nor the concomitant jouissance of criminality. 
For Bellow and Chesterton such scepticism is not only tragic but fake, and it 
dangerously undermines the prohibition against murder. 
 My understanding of Butler’s work on precarity and precariousness 
is as an attempt to navigate between the two extremes: the insistence on 
the immediacy and availability of life as a life, and the ‘loss of the world’ 
that separates the apprehension or appearance of living from the ethical 
recognition of precariousness: ‘to say that a life is precarious requires not 
only that a life be apprehended as a life, but also that precariousness be 
an aspect of what is apprehended in what is living’.25 In Butler’s account 
precariousness is simultaneously normatively recognized and yet what escapes 
recognition. Precariousness is not simply finitude, the solitary (Heideggerian) 
being-towards-death. It is a condition that always already implies ‘living 
socially, that is, the fact that one’s life is always in some sense in the hands 
of the other’.26 Precariousness is therefore a grounding that is also a ‘kind of 
“ungrounding”’,27 bodily exposure inscribed in the Levinasian substitutional 
structure of the-one-for-the-other. 
 Butler’s own framing of animals’ lives as ungrievable both validates her 
analysis and shows its weakness. ‘Precarious life implies life as a conditioned 
process, and not as the internal feature of a monadic individual or any 
other anthropocentric conceit’.28 This, I argue, highlights some of the 
limitations of accounts that locate violence in the mechanisms of exclusion 
and othering and seek a remedy in a ‘radical’ politics of precariousness - a 
politics rooted in the immanence of bodily exposure and oriented towards 
the saving transcendence of alterity that ‘calls into question the ontology of 
individualism’.29 But anthropocentrism and the self are not synonymous terms, 
and there is a space - it may well be the space of subjectivity as such - where 
I encounter my own negativity and inhumanity; the possibility that ‘in its 
posited particularity [the subject] may be constantly exposed to the aporia - 
not the self-identity - of its particularity with the singularity and universality 
of itself and others’.30 More importantly in the present context, if we do need 
a ‘new’ bodily ontology that is first and foremost nonanthropocentric, this is 
an ontology which Butler’s account, for all that is progressive about it, falls 
short of delivering. 
III  POSTHUMANIST ETHICS
Who also hath made us able ministers of the new testament; not of the 
letter, but of the spirit: for the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life.31 
In a move that radicalizes Levinas (and Butler), Calarco states that ‘if it is 
24. Cary Wolfe, What 
is Posthumanism?, 
Minneapolis, 
University of 
Minnesota Press, 
2010, p172; Rose, 
Hegel Contra 
Sociology, op. cit., 
pp1-50. 
25. Butler, Frames of 
War, op. cit., p13. 
See also Judith 
Butler, Precarious 
Life: The Powers 
of Mourning and 
Violence, London, 
Verso, 2004. 
26. Butler, Frames of 
War, op. cit., p14.
27. Ibid., p22. 
28. Ibid., p23.
29. Ibid., p33. 
30. Rose, Mourning 
Becomes the Law, op. 
cit., p56.
31. 2 Corinthians 
3:6, King James 
Version.
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indeed the case that we cannot know in advance where the face begins and 
ends … we are obliged to proceed from the possibility that anything might take 
on a face. And we are further obliged to uphold this possibility permanently 
open’.32 Such ethical ‘agnosticism’ fulfils the promise of Levinasian ethics by, 
as it were, maintaining the alterity of alterity.33 ‘Toward an Agnostic Animal 
Ethics’ is a response to Paola Cavalieri’s philosophical dialogue ‘The Death of 
the Animal’, in which Cavalieri advances a non-perfectionist, non-speciesist 
recognition of the ‘moral status’ of (some) nonhuman animals. As Calarco 
sees no objective, legitimate limit, cap, or criterion for excluding certain 
beings from access to moral consideration, he rejects the concept of ‘moral 
status’ as by definition exclusory and excluding.34 While ethical agnosticism is 
not immediately concerned with the range of existing things such as plants 
and objects, Calarco is aware of the risk of a universal moral consideration 
that presupposes no inside/outside: 
While it might not be unreasonable to consider the possibility that 
animals who are subjects (which is where Cavalieri draws the line of moral 
consideration) could have a moral claim on us, are we also to believe 
that animals without any sort of subjectivity, as well as insects, dirt, hair, 
fingernails, ecosystems, and so on could also have a claim on us?35
‘It is important to stress’, Calarco replies, that ‘universal consideration does 
not make the positive claim that all things or all life forms do count; nor 
does it supply any positive claim concerning how various beings or relational 
structures might count’.36 
 The creaturely approach I propose embraces the notion that everything 
counts. To be is to count, and in this respect ethical openness is synonymous 
with, cannot escape, the conviction that things matter, and matter morally. 
Where I agree with Calarco is that how things matter is, as Clare Palmer has 
shown, contextual, as well as dependent on the (ever-shifting) limits of our 
attention.37 Nevertheless, Calarco’s account of agnostic animal ethics chimes 
rather strikingly with the present resurgence in vitalist and ‘new materialist’ 
theory engaged in a double ‘awakening’: the reawakening of ‘inanimate’ 
matter itself, the view of life as essentially expressive, and a reawakening of 
our own heretofore inanimate, ‘dead’ (dualistic, one-directional, instrumental) 
relationship to matter.38  
 Jane Bennett’s exhilarating Vibrant Matter (reviewed in new formations by 
Graham Harman) presents ‘vital materialism’ as a form of acknowledgement 
of the reality (the vitality) of matter. Bennett is keen to tap the potential of 
this new ‘political ecology of things’, and although not explicitly interested in 
universal moral consideration, the framework of relations in Bennett’s work 
is certainly, even literally, universal.39 Whereas Calarco invokes the ‘outside’ 
of transcendent alterity as the source of an open ethics of life, Bennett works 
through the ‘inside’ of immanence to assert similarly open-ended living 
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multiplicities; Calarco’s ethics is heteronomous, Bennett’s is autonomous. 
Here again, we can detect the two currents of immanence and transcendence 
paralleling or mirroring one another. 
 But where are the complementary axial gestures of the movement 
inward and downward, the ‘fall towards the heights,’ in post-anthropocentric 
transcendental Levinasianism? Calarco realizes the importance of returning 
from love to law, the demands issued by the immanent and the concrete, the 
finite relations and practices that have to be considered under the auspices 
of universal moral consideration: indeed, the focus on animals in particular 
is itself a tacit acknowledgement of this. Still, Calarco’s return to immanence 
remains largely ‘strategic’; it is the alterity of animals that is key.40 Conversely, 
Bennett’s admirable, often moving readings remain purely immanent. One 
wonders, therefore, whence the ethical command to relate differently - to 
relate justly - to the many things of the world, to welcome them in their vitality 
and alterity, emanates. Why should the recognition of the vitality of matter 
itself enhance ecological multispecies responsibility? Kathryn Yusoff ’s analysis 
of the 2011 UK government’s White Paper The Natural Choice: Securing the 
Value of Nature suggests that not only is a ‘vibrant’ conception of nature itself 
insufficient, but actually exacerbates the exploitation of nature, seen now 
not only as raw material or ‘standing reserve’ but as an active deliverer of 
‘ecosystem services’.41 
 If neither the appeal to radical immanence nor the appeal to radical 
transcendence independently yields the ethical consideration we seek, a 
different constellation is required. To the recognition of the ‘immanence 
of the world’, I want to add an engagement with ideas deriving from the 
‘transcendence over the world’, and vice versa. The manoeuvre insists that 
pure immanence or pure transcendence alone does not engender viable ethical 
and political possibilities since each replicates rather than problematizes the 
metaphysical notion of an absolute yet arbitrary foundation.  
 In a recent TLS review of Conor Cunningham’s Darwin’s Pious Idea, 
Rowan Williams argues for precisely such a rapport between the theological 
and the materialist reference points. Echoing Bennett’s recognition of 
matter’s agentic capacities - what she calls ‘thing power’ - Williams endows 
matter with ‘the possibility of mind’.42 Williams’ conception of matter can be 
read, in Bennett’s register, immanently; indeed one can think of Williams’ 
account as representing the parallel attributes of Spinoza’s one substance 
(‘God or Nature’): extension (matter) and thought (consciousness).43 ‘Matter 
itself is pregnant with meanings’, Williams continues, ‘in the sense that the 
complexification of matter over the ages ends up in the phenomenon of 
consciousness’.44 Discussing the implications of the rise of genetics, Williams 
suggests that ‘something seriously analogous to intelligence has to be 
presupposed in matter for the entire system of transmitted patterns and 
“instructions” to be possible’.45 Yet this mapping on of mind to matter and 
matter to mind, the idea promoted by some physicists that ‘it is more true to 
animal commodities. 
39. Jane Bennett, 
Vibrant Matter: A 
Political Ecology of 
Things, Durham, 
Duke University 
Press, 2010. 
40. Calarco, Death of 
the Animal, op. cit., 
p82.
41. Kathryn Yusoff, 
‘The Valuation of 
Nature: The Natural 
Choice White Paper,’ 
Radical Philosophy 
170 (November/
December 2011), 
http://www.
radicalphilosophy.
com/commentary/
the-valuation-of-
nature (accessed 17 
January, 2012). 
42. Rowan Williams, 
‘Such a Thing’, 
TLS, 22 April, 2011, 
pp8-9.
43. In the Ethics 
Spinoza states 
that ‘thinking 
substance and 
extended substance 
are one and the 
same substance, 
comprehended now 
under this attribute, 
now under that. 
So, too, a mode 
of Extension and 
the idea of that 
mode are one and 
the same thing, 
expressed in two 
ways’ (Pr. 5, II). 
Baruch Spinoza, 
Ethics: Treatise on 
the Emendation of the 
Intellect and Selected 
Letters, trans. Samuel 
Shirley, Cambridge, 
Hackett Publishing, 
1992.
44. Williams, ‘Such a 
Thing’, op. cit., p8. 
45. Ibid., p8.
78     NEW FORMATIONS
say matter is a property of consciousness than the other way around - echoing 
the ancient philosophical dictum that the body is “in” the soul rather than 
the soul in the body’,46 undergoes a specifically Christian turn in Williams’ 
subsequent point that 
the evolutionary model he [Cunningham] has supported, especially in 
its anti-dualism, is wholly congruent with the mainstream of Christian 
metaphysics and theology … We can easily make the mistake of thinking 
that materiality is itself the problem; but the whole structure of Greek 
patristic and medieval Christian thinking should direct us firmly away 
from this, and recall us to the conviction of the sacredness of matter which 
stands at the heart of classical Christian doctrine.47 
This translation from immanent materiality to the transcendence of the 
sacred and from materiality and the sacred to the doctrinal are at the heart 
of a creaturely ethics. Ethics is not sanctioned from above or below. As the 
theologian Stanley Hauerwas has argued, ‘our moral life is the process in which 
our convictions form our character to be truthful’.48 Creaturely ethics does 
not justify itself at the level of materiality and finitude because these alone 
do not constitute an obligation or a command; nor does creatureliness simply 
ascribe the sanctity of matter to a source outside the world. It is precisely 
the lived conjunction between here and elsewhere that enables a critique of 
liberal moral theory and the ethics of the Other alike. 
 At the end of the essay I provide my own ‘doctrinal’ exchange between 
love and law in the everyday practice of veganism, which I regard as an 
expression of a creaturely sensibility that exceeds the discrete notions of moral 
status and animal rights and embraces a more comprehensive attitude which 
is both legalistic (in that it prohibits the consumption of animal products) 
and amorous (in that it affirms a relation of love towards fellow creatures) - 
veganism as a form of ‘love’s work’.49
IV  CREATURELY ETHICS: NECESSITY AND ATTENTION
The apparent circularity of Simone Weil’s statement that ‘the vulnerability 
of precious things is beautiful because vulnerability is a mark of existence’ 
reveals the conflation in her life and thought between the immanent and 
the transcendent.50 Seemingly tautological, the statement affirms that 
existing things must be loved, and loved because they exist, because they 
are vulnerable. Vulnerability, beauty, and existence are terms that repeat one 
another in three registers: the ontological, aesthetic, and ethical. But the 
tautology is only superficial. The intention is not only to represent necessity in 
words through the circular structure, but for the sentence to institute, to become 
necessity. The idea that necessity should be loved as necessity is central to Weil 
and reminiscent of both Nietzsche and Spinoza, for whom understanding the 
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid., p8 (my 
emphasis).
48. Stanley 
Hauerwas, The 
Peaceable Kingdom: 
A Primer in Christian 
Ethics, London, SCM 
Press, 2003, p16. 
49. Gillian Rose’s 
Love’s Work: A 
Reckoning with Life 
was first published in 
1995. My references 
are to the new 
edition, New York: 
New York Review 
Books, 2011. 
50. Weil, Gravity and 
Grace, op. cit., p108.
TURNING TO ANIMALS BETWEEN LOVE AND LAW    79
necessary connections that refute contingency is the highest good (Spinoza 
calls this intellectual love, or amor dei intellectualis). For Weil, 
[t]he beautiful in nature is a union of the sensible impression and the sense 
of necessity. Things must be like that (in the first place), and, precisely, 
they are like that.51
Necessity, the ‘mechanism of the world’ represented by logic (and revealed 
to the mind in pure mathematics) is equivalent to transcendence, or 
grace. Gravity and grace are brought together when one sees through the 
mystifications of ideology and psychology and into the conditions of reality. 
Perceived as necessity, reality becomes beautiful because we no longer desire 
to ‘redeem’ it by imagining it as something that obeys our fantasies about 
how things ought to be. Political and ethical transformation according to 
Weil occurs within, not beyond, the idea of necessity: ‘To act not for an object 
but from necessity’.52 Weil is a strict realist: she understands that meaningful 
change comes from an adequate appreciation of necessity. 
 As an ethics of life, creatureliness does not simply denote embodiment but 
a particular comportment towards the finitude, abundance, and vulnerability 
of materiality recognized as necessity. To say that the creaturely is indifferent 
to human and nonhuman life is to sidestep deconstructions of the human/
nonhuman boundary as largely extraneous. While conceptually attractive, 
efforts to undo human identity run the (Levinasian) risk of a flirtation with 
Otherness at the expense of examining the concrete relations of power that 
underwrite human domination of animals. If meat consumption, factory 
farming, land encroachment, species extinction, and vivisection are anything 
to go by, the exploitation of nonhumans continues unabated and has even 
intensified in the posthuman age (when breakthroughs in biotechnology have 
unsettled the classic understanding of the human). We could argue that there 
is simply too much ‘“bad” posthumanism’ around.53 Or it may be that it is not 
enough to pursue the ‘end’ of the human subject (as either what comes after or 
as that which never was) without committing to and detailing a revised order 
of relations, which turns ‘us,’ whatever we happen to be, towards animals in 
a decisively different way. 
 In keeping with ethical agnosticism, creaturely ethics does not seek out 
the qualities or capacities that warrant inclusion in the moral community 
but rather suggests that all existents by virtue of their perishable material 
being are morally significant. Creatureliness is thus critical of the idea of 
moral status, linked to the dominant ‘capabilities model’ of animal rights. 
The capabilities model, which infuses the utilitarianism of Peter Singer and 
the rights models of Tom Regan and Martha Nussbaum, allocates rights in 
accordance with abilities that nonhuman animals are deemed to possess, be 
they, roughly, cognitive (Cavalieri), sensate (Jeremy Bentham, Singer), or 
existential (Regan, Nussbaum). 
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 By contrast, a creaturely ethics does not rest on capacities that nonhuman 
animals may (or may not) possess, on the basis of which they would be 
‘granted’ or ‘owed’ particular rights. Instead of extending rights to deserving 
animals, based on our sense of what it means to be a moral subject or patient, 
creatureliness contracts humanity to recuperate its animality. In rooting ethical 
thought first and foremost in materiality and not in the rights of ‘qualified’ 
individuals, the distinctions between humans and animals, as far as ethical 
consideration is concerned, are erased. Not only does creatureliness apply 
across the range of living beings and so go beyond Agamben’s bare and 
Butler’s precarious life, it draws on the predicament of animals as exemplary 
of precarity as such. 
 While agnostic, creatureliness is not an ethics of the indefinite Other. 
From the intimations of alterity, creatureliness rebounds to the normative 
requirements of daily life. It does so by employing the mode Weil calls 
‘attention’. As in Levinas, attention suspends the egotistical, muscular will. 
Whereas ‘I can will to put my hand on the table’, the will does not partake 
in matters of ‘inner purity, inspiration or truth of thought’.54 ‘What could be 
more stupid than to tighten up our muscles and set our jaws about virtue, or 
poetry, or the solution of a problem. Attention is something quite different’.55 
Attention is a relaxing of the will that opens to the outside by drawing back 
from the object. In solving a mathematical problem, for instance, the mind, 
momentarily emptied of the imaginings of self (my fear that I am no good 
at maths, my pride at being naturally gifted, my desire for a good mark, etc.) 
makes a space for truth (necessity) to fill. Thus, to do well, and to do good, 
‘[a]ttention alone - that attention which is so full that the “I” disappears 
- is required of me’.56 Attention means being lost in the undertaking and 
separated  - detached - from my personal or societal ‘investment’ in the 
particular task.
 In seeking justice for animals, rights and the capabilities model represent 
a wilful tackling of the issue. These approaches are not sufficiently detached 
from the problem they face and so produce forced explanations that 
‘defeat their own object’:57 animals as ‘subjects-of-a-life’ (Regan), utilitarian 
calculations of the sum total of pleasure and pain (Singer), the predicates of 
‘moral status’ (Cavalieri) distract from attention to animals that sees them 
and us first in our necessity as ‘modes’ of nature (to use Spinoza’s term). Only 
once necessity has been glimpsed through attention can particular actions 
be tested out in real life. As Lloyd explains, for Weil ‘[a]ttention is the only 
genuine source of obligation’58 because ‘attention turned with love towards 
God (or in a lesser degree, towards anything which is truly beautiful) makes 
certain things impossible for us’.59
 Weil’s religious rhetoric can seem alien, even off-putting. But God here 
functions as ‘that which makes attention possible’,60 the mode of approaching a 
question or a task that detaches itself from the contaminating presuppositions 
of social convention, passions like fear and pride, or philosophical (and, for 
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that matter, religious) dogma. So Weil is not, as might first appear, a bipolar 
(supersessionist) thinker opposing ‘worldly’ to ‘divine obligation’.61 Turning 
towards animals via the mode of attention means acknowledging their reality, 
not subjecting them to some otherworldly principle of divine grace. When 
attention sees the beauty of the ‘vulnerability of precious things’ as their 
‘mark of existence,’ there is an interdiction against violence: 
The beautiful is a carnal attraction which keeps us at a distance and 
implies a renunciation. This includes the renunciation of that which is 
most deep-seated, the imagination. We want to eat all the other objects of 
desire. The beautiful is that which we desire without wishing to eat it. We desire 
that it should be.62 
The omnivorous orality of the human psyche is fuelled by an imaginary 
attachment to objects. Attention (not analysis) can help counter the 
imagination, which pleases by mystifying and perverting our relations to 
others. Beauty is, once more, not elevated but earthly: we see the beauty 
of objects when we peel off their imaginary coating through the practice of 
attention.  
 Weil’s thought is in the shape of the cross. The intersecting of gravity and 
grace, verticality and horizontality, love and law, is apparent in the aphoristic, 
compact, and chiastic form of her prose. But we are not encouraged to aspire 
to the heights, to defy gravity and levitate by the power of grace. As Lloyd 
poignantly puts it: ‘while gravity goes down, grace does not go up. Grace goes 
down “without weight”. To understand this is to understand Weil’s thought’.63 
This is the meaning of descending upwards, or love’s work.  
***
LOVE’S WORK
One must either not eat any meat, not kill any animals; or look upon 
animals as machines after the style of Descartes; or surround their death 
with certain religious images. Otherwise, what is more calculated to take 
away all notion of morality in children? 
        Simone Weil64
I will stay in the fray, in the revel of ideas and risk; learning, failing, wooing, 
grieving, trusting, working, reposing - in this sin of language and lips. 
       Gillian Rose65
Veganism is a form of ‘love’s work’. The idea that veganism has meaning 
both as a philosophical argument and as mode of social and, for that matter, 
liturgical practice is often overlooked in debates in animal ethics that 
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distinguish ‘theory’ from ‘practice’. I want to offer a different description 
of veganism that re-inscribes it in the Continental tradition within which I 
converse. This is not only to pre-empt the usual question that follows the 
elucidation of a crisis: So what, then, do you propose we do? but to re-contextualize 
veganism as a way of living, an act that, far from assuming the position of 
moral superiority (with its tacit admonition to non-vegans) or indicating 
a degree of remove from daily life, entails in its very incompleteness and 
imperfections, a conscious participation in the world, participation with a 
difference - the descending upwards of Weil’s ‘fall towards the heights’. 
 Veganism does not draw back from violence in the conceit that violence will 
cease. The pacifist is not a vegan insofar as pacifism refuses to accept the reality 
of violence as a limit. Hauerwas and Berkman’s comments on the connections 
between (Christian) pacifism and vegetarianism make a similar point: ‘we 
believe that Christians are not called to be nonviolent because nonviolence 
is a strategy to free the world from war, but because as Christians we cannot 
conceive of living other than nonviolently in a world of war’.66 Veganism is a 
constant reminder of the omnivorous orality that propels us towards beings 
and things - things we approach by devouring. As a particular way of ‘eating’ 
(in the sense of coming into contact, of consuming and becoming, but also 
commingling with and responding to the symbolic and biological agency of 
encountered, ingested matter) veganism is also an affirmation of hunger as 
desire and love of the world: ‘Eros ranges from sexual desire to intellectual 
curiosity. It’s just a hunger’.67 
 My understanding of veganism as an acknowledging of creaturely love 
is not dissimilar from the approach developed by Donna Haraway in When 
Species Meet. For Haraway, ‘becoming-with’ entails realizing that we are 
always living and transforming with the assemblages of nonhuman critters 
that surround and inhabit us. Clearly, eating animals is a key issue in such 
interspecies entanglements. A detailed response to Haraway is impossible 
here, but the contours of our disagreement are significant. I cannot detach 
the idea of love that underpins Haraway’s accounts of interspecies ‘worlding’ 
from an abstention from consuming animal flesh. While I agree that hunters, 
for example, may relate to their prey in complex ways, I have difficulty 
conceiving this as a relation of love.68 How are the practices of hunting and 
love compatible? We need to discuss what exactly we mean when we say we 
‘love’ animals, but I concur with Hauerwas that ‘our practices with regard 
to other animals shape our beliefs about them’.69 If ‘our practices, more 
than our arguments, reveal and shape what is truly important to us’, then 
‘vegetarianism may well be a prerequisite’, not the end, of animal ethics.70 
 Legal scholar Gary Francione is a passionate advocate of veganism as 
the ‘moral baseline’ of the animal rights movement. The abolitionist theory 
developed by Francione is rarely discussed in works of a Continental bent. This 
is one reason for including abolitionism here, in the context of a creaturely 
postscript on veganism. The second is that Francione’s abolitionism rests on 
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the claim that ‘animal rights theory is the only way to alter the status of animals 
as property, or “things”, and thereby eliminate the person/thing dualism that 
is the foundation of all institutionalized exploitation’.71 Francione believes 
that rights theory is by definition abolitionist, that it requires ending, not 
regulating the use of animals for human purposes. He distinguishes between 
the ‘use’ and ‘treatment’ of animals, and suggests that animal rights, in 
contrast to animal welfare, tackles the core issue of animal use.72 
 Francione’s abolitionist vegan advocacy is consistent with the approach to 
animal ethics I have been developing. Yet Francione’s thinking falls firmly on 
one side of the division between love and law. His animal rights theory is a 
clear example of the understanding of animal exploitation, and the solution 
to it, in purely legal terms: 
We can use animals for food, in experiments, for clothing or entertainment 
only because animals are things; they have no interests that cannot be 
‘sacrificed’ if it is thought (correctly or mistakenly) to be in the interests 
of humans. This is precisely what it means to be property.73 
If earlier I showed ethics and biopolitics as highlighting the exception to law 
in the love/law divide, here the logic of exclusion is employed in the opposite 
direction to explain the prevalence of violence against animals. It is as if the 
presence of violence were the result of a legal error. Animals are not the Other 
that sustains (human) law; their faulty status within the law deprives them of 
the rights they would otherwise hold. Once the law is amended, violence will 
disappear. Again, violence is relegated to an outside, this time outside the 
realm of legalistic rational thought, and it is the task of the theorist, the activist, 
and the educator to restore rationality to end what is essentially the illogical 
perpetration of violence. In this respect, abolitionism and welfarism, despite 
their difference in relation to the question of treatment and use, both derive 
the meaning of oppression from a single, legal-rational, source: they disagree 
on the implications of ‘property’ and ‘person’ as legal categories that apply 
to animals. Welfare reform does not dispute the property status of animals, 
while abolitionism demands that animals cease to be property altogether. 
 Whereas welfarism is rightly unmasked by Francione as a humanist 
discourse that ranks human life essentially higher than animal life and so is 
prepared to exploit animals within the boundaries of ‘humane’ treatment, 
in abolitionism, too, we can identify a latent essentialism, a recognition of 
the sanctity or creatureliness of animal life that is pre- or supra-legal. The 
‘absolutism’ that Francione’s ‘controversial’ (his term) animal rights theory 
is sometimes accused of attests to this. But the moral force of abolitionist 
theory does not lie in either its alleged ‘extremism’ or its lucid legalisms. 
It lies, for me, in the combination between a legal proscription (to end the 
property status of animals) and the recognition of the precariousness of animal 
life that the notion of ‘personhood’, albeit imperfectly, implies. Francione 
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is in agreement with the more radical Continental thinkers that there can 
be no pre-conditions for moral consideration. Sentience alone is sufficient. 
I have shown how a range of approaches, including my own, go further 
than sentience, but abolitionism strikes me as the closest, most attractive 
articulation that Continental animal ethics points to without legislating. 
 Abolitionism is not, as it is sometimes portrayed, an ‘all or nothing’ utopian 
principle. Its insistence on veganism (rather than vegetarianism) and on the 
end (rather than the regulation) of animal use does not deny actuality. In 
Hegel Contra Sociology Rose explains the significance of ‘thinking the absolute’: 
Thinking the absolute means recognizing actuality as determinants of our 
acting by recognizing it in our acts. Thus recognizing our transformative 
or productive activity has special claim as a mode of acknowledging 
actuality which transcends the dichotomies between theoretical and 
practical reason, between positing and posited. Transformative activity 
acknowledges actuality in the act and does not oppose act to non-act.74
Abolitionism remains a theory of the ‘broken middle’ that dares think the 
absolute. To claim that abolitionist thinking sets us up for failure because 
the absolute is, naturally, actually, impossible, is to misunderstand the nature 
and value of failing the absolute. For as Rose and as Weil each point out, 
reality (Weil) or actuality (Rose) can only be grasped in the act of its limited 
transforming once the absolute that transcends all limits and oppositions 
has been glimpsed. 
 Once its legalism has been confronted, deepened, and supplanted by the 
broader concerns about violence, alterity, precariousness, and justice that 
have animated the present discussion of creatureliness, abolitionism takes 
on the complexity and ambivalence - the limits placed by actuality - that it 
otherwise lacks. The abolitionist struggle becomes not strictly the matter of 
logical persuasion based on faith in the foundational authority of law but also 
a matter of law’s Other - what J.M. Coetzee described as an ethical ‘conversion 
experience’.75 
 Perhaps more than any other writer on the ethical question of animals, 
Coetzee explores the tensions between conversion (grace) and persuasion 
(reason). Is that not the meaning of Coetzee’s title, Disgrace? And is not 
Elizabeth Costello similarly suspended between love and law and between 
mourning and melancholy, trying, and failing, to chart her way between the 
two poles? In ‘The Comedy of Hegel,’ Rose defends the dignity and decency of 
law in the face of the ethical touting of Otherness, and defines the brokenness 
through which life as mournful but necessary toil carries on:
if all human law is sheer violence, if there is no positive or symbolic law 
to be acknowledged - the law that decrees the absence of the other, the 
necessity of relinquishing the dead one, returning from devastating inner 
74. Rose, Hegel 
Contra Sociology, op. 
cit., p218.  
75. John M. 
Coetzee, ‘Notes on 
Issues Raised by 
Matthew Calarco’, in 
Death of the Animal, 
op. cit., p89.
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grief to the law of the everyday and of relationships, old and new, with 
those who live - then there can be no work, no exploring of the legacy 
of ambivalence, working through the contradictory emotions aroused by 
bereavement.76 
 
Creatureliness - freely attending to our own unfreedom, our rootedness in 
materiality and necessity - is the ‘fall towards the heights’. The paradox of 
descending upwards entails being suspended between endless (rigid) love and 
rigid (endless) law. In Rose’s beautiful words, inspired by Weil, which insist 
on the continuity between the corporeal, ethical, and political: 
The pathos of gravity - of weight, ground, earth, city - channelled to 
grace - the response to ethical commandment - means that spiritual and 
religious life, supernatural, is not radically divorced from nature, being, 
logic and politics.77 
Like Weil, Rose has little to say about animals.78 But the case of animals 
offers a particular challenge to the holding together of love and law, ethics 
and politics. Creatureliness pursues both sides of the division between the 
immanent and the transcendent, the lawlessness of love that shows up the 
limits of the contractarian framework, and the possibility of a different 
normative order. The creaturely is not a catchall term but rather allows us 
to consider the human and the animal in a state of suspension between 
exclusion and kinship without projecting innocence on either side. Rose said 
she was ‘too Jewish to be Christian, and too Christian to be Jewish’. My sense 
of the creaturely repeats the chiasmus - in place of Derrida’s ‘the animal that 
therefore I am’, this more follows: a creature too human to be animal and 
too animal to be human. 
76. Rose, Mourning 
Becomes the Law, op. 
cit., p70.
77. Gillian Rose, 
Paradiso, London, 
Menard Press, 1999, 
p63.
78. But in Paradiso 
Rose writes of 
St Bernard who 
killed a blackbird 
that disrupted his 
preaching: ‘How 
could St Bernard … 
how can we know, 
whether it is not the 
blackbird who, with 
special sweetness, 
sings the Word of 
God?’ (17).
